Introduction

In August 2007, a Russian submersible placed a titanium marker depicting the nation’s flag on the seabed at the North Pole. It was a declaration of sovereignty. In Canada, the reaction was muted. By international agreement, competing claims were to be decided by negotiation under the auspices of the UN. Foreign Affairs Minister Peter Mackay dismissed the Russian action as a 15th century gesture, not to be taken seriously in the 21st. Nevertheless, by that act, Russia served notice to other countries with an interest in Arctic waters – Canada, the U.S., Denmark and Norway – that it was deadly serious about maximising its claim to an ocean floor thought to be rich in minerals and fossil fuels, now that global warming and the resulting diminished ice pack had made it more accessible.

Both the U.S. and Canada have accelerated their Arctic research, in support of their own claims.
However, in an aggressive speech that fell just short of a threat of annexation – another supposedly archaic gesture – Russian President Dimitry Medvedev in September 2008 ordered the Russian National Security Council to “define the borders in the north of our country, where the Arctic lies.” (1)

At issue is an area of 463,000 square miles – the size of western Europe – which Russia first claimed in 2001 under the agreed international protocol. That claim was neither accepted nor rejected, and further scientific data was requested.

Since then, the Russians have launched a massive exploration effort. Clearly, when an increasingly assertive Russian leadership resubmits its claim in 2009, it intends to present other northern-tier nations with boundaries that in its own mind at least, leave little room for negotiation – backed as they are by scientific data, a proven pattern of use, and an uncompromising national will.

It is the contention of this paper that Russia follows this increasingly well thought-out strategy for obvious economic advantage, but also for psychological reasons rooted in paranoia, and wounded national pride. In particular, this paper argues that while U.S.-Canadian disagreements over Arctic boundaries – and in particular the status of the Northwest Passage – are well known and complex, it is the vastness and confidence of Russian claims that are most provocative. Canada therefore, having for more than a century paid little attention to its own Arctic interests, must now move quickly to fully prepare its scientific case. And, while war in the high Arctic remains a remote possibility only, Canada must also procure the necessary equipment to move around the Arctic as ably as the Russians, in order to supplement its science-based claims through commercial use and military presence.

The efforts of the present government in Ottawa are praiseworthy, but must be accelerated.

Sovereignty challenges in the Arctic

Maps have a subliminal power to shape our perceptions. Canadians, for instance, think of the Arctic (if they think of it at all) as Canadian from the 141 degrees line of longitude in the west, (the line dividing Alaska from the Yukon extended to the North Pole). to a similar line in the east running to the pole from an agreed point between Ellesmere Island and the Danish possession of Greenland. It is called the sectoral principle, and for decades, textbooks and reproductions of maps elsewhere and for other purposes than education have accustomed Canadians to see the northern extremity of their country as pie-shaped, with the point at the North Pole. It is neat, logical – and will require Ottawa’s focussed attention if anything resembling it is to survive a forthcoming U.N.-sponsored settlement of Arctic boundaries. For, it is very much in dispute by other countries of the northern tier, and not even official Ottawa seems unanimous on the matter.

Until quite recently, such disagreements mattered little. The Arctic Ocean was home only to the Inuit, frozen, penetrable only with great difficulty by specially designed and prepared ice-breaking ships. Commercial navigation and resource extraction were rendered impossible by economics, and sovereignty discussions moot by sheer lack of urgency.

Sovereignty ignored

Consequently, for most of Confederation, Canadian national leaders have been content to declare Canadian Arctic sovereignty, but not to exercise or pay for it. Typical was John Diefenbaker’s vague rhetoric of 1958 in which he apparently advanced a vague sectoral claim, “I see a new Canada – a Canada of the North.” It was delivered with the ardent passion for which the former prime minister was noted, but followed by no action.

The sovereignty voyages of the RCMP schooner St. Roch through the Northwest Passage in 1940 to 1944 is the proverbial exception that proves the rule: This was exactly the kind of action the Dominion government should have been routinely undertaking, but was in fact the only one of its kind for decades before and since. Even after the start of the Cold War, when strategists in Washington and Moscow found new significance in the Arctic as the shortest route between the two continents for bombers, ballistic missiles and submarines, Canada (fearing U.S. pushback) avoided making specific detailed claims. In retrospect, it would have been better had Ottawa done so.

In the 1940s and ’50s, Canada’s contribution to the defeat of the Axis and its firm commitment in Korea and NATO’s European Central Front had won Washington’s respect. Claims that today will almost certainly be vigorously challenged, might then have been more easily conceded. However, successive governments of both parties preferred a policy of vigorous ambiguity to the expense of fleshing out a sectoral claim with meaningful physical control – outposts, weather stations, or perhaps taking some responsibility for continental defence through building and manning the Distant Early Warning line.(2)

Even hard-to-ignore events provoked no meaningful response. In August 1958, the nuclear submarine USS Nautilus passed under the North Pole on a voyage from Pearl Harbour to Portland (Great Britain), demonstrating that while surface navigation remained difficult, Arctic waters were now accessible under the ice. It took the 1969 voyage of the American oil tanker Manhattan (3) through the Northwest Passage to provoke public opinion in Canada sufficiently to demand action.

The government of the day however, that of Liberal Pierre Trudeau, again shrank from investing in Arctic infrastructure and instead passed the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act. Backed by the then-modest investment required in the tools of enforcement, it would have been a useful first step. However, in their absence, it was merely a resolution to forbid littering, when what was required was a “No Trespassing” sign and a surly dog. In particular, the Act left unclear upon what precise basis parts of the Arctic were considered Canadian. Trudeau, it must be said, failed to grasp the necessity of precision on this point, and his own self-appraisal of these events in his 1995 book ‘The Canadian Way,” opined that his softball approach had “dealt chauvinism a well-deserved blow.” (4)

In 1977, a Russian research station built on an ice floe drifted into the Canadian sector. In a slightly comedic moment, then-defence minister Barney Danson overflew the Russians and dropped a message in a bottle – “Welcome to Canada.” (5)

As things turned out, it was the most vigorous practical assertion of Canada’s Arctic sovereignty during the Trudeau years. Sadly, it was barely exceeded under the stewardship of the Progressive Conservative Prime Minister Brian Mulroney, whose government replaced the Liberals in 1984. There was brave talk, to be sure: In 1985, mere months after Mulroney took office, the U.S. Coast Guard icebreaker Polar Sea passed through the Northwest Passage, causing great indignation in Ottawa, as prior permission had not been sought. One consequence was that the Mulroney government formally defined Canadian Arctic territory as the islands of the Arctic archipelago, drawing baselines across bays, estuaries and points of land as prescribed by international law, to entirely enclose them, and to claim all waters within as internal waters under complete Canadian control – including the disputed route through them, the Northwest Passage.

Showing once more the confusion in official Ottawa, it was not the sectoral principle, of Canadian high school maps. But, it was a firm claim.The other result was that the 1987 Defence Review called for a fleet of 12 nuclear submarines capable of operating under the ice, as well as a heavy (Polar icebreaker.

Briefly, it appeared that Ottawa was prepared to pay the price of insisting upon Canada’s Arctic interests. But it was not to be. The Mulroney cabinet was struggling with annual deficits of $30 billion, due mostly to interest on the national debt accumulated before the party took office. The Arctic threat seemed too remote, both in time and space, and certainly from the interests of the electorate. Then, the Cold War ended and with it, the rationale for the nuclear submarines: While Canadians might – with extreme difficulty – be cajoled into buying them to stalk Russian submarines in Canadian waters, there was not a chance they would just to keep track of allied – U.S. and British – submarines thought to be routinely operating there. A peace dividend was declared: First the submarines were cancelled, then in 1990, the Polar 8 icebreaker.

Canada’s Arctic sovereignty challenge becomes unavoidable

A decade later, Canada was forced to confront rival Arctic claims for two reasons:

1) The effects of global warming were making access possible to areas of the Arctic where there was a realistic possibility of minerals and fossil fuels in commercial – possibly vast – quantities. Not all scientists agree about the extent or cause of warming, but a University of Alberta study based on a helicopter-borne electromagnetic survey of multiple sites reported in 2008 that the Arctic ice cap was getting thinner, and that heavy, old ice near the North Pole was being widely replaced by weaker first-year ice. The researchers suggest the possibility that “the Arctic sea-ice cover has transitioned into a different climatic state where ice-free summers would soon become normal.” (6) That also means the Northwest Passage might be fully navigable sooner than expected, and therefore the inevitable challenge to Canada’s claimed sovereignty over it. Other northern-tier nations were preparing to advance their claims.

2) Since 1982, a legal mechanism existed for them to do so. Under the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), territorial boundaries in the Arctic are to be peacefully negotiated among nations that have ratified UNCLOS, through its subsidiary, the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf. Four types of maritime jurisdiction are recognized under UNCLOS.

i) Internal waters: Lakes, rivers and bays and estuaries delimited by straight baselines (60 mile maximum) drawn from headland to headland. This gives total control: Under all circumstances, foreign-flagged vessels require clearance to enter these waters.

ii) Territorial waters: Coastal waters, usually to a 12 nautical mile limit, through which foreign-flagged vessels have the right of innocent passage.

iii) The Economic Exclusion Zone. (200 nautical miles from the low- tide mark.)

iv) Continental shelf up to 150 nautical miles beyond the 200 nautical mile baseline may be claimed, for a total of 350 nautical miles, where the shelf is demonstrably part of a continental land mass. This effort to connect features of the Arctic seabed to Greenland, North America or the Eurasian world-island has emerged as the principal object of research by all nations with Arctic claims. Upon ratification of UNCLOS, signatory states have 10 years to make and support claims to define their continental shelf, and their 350 mile continental-shelf boundary.

Norway ratified the convention in 1996, Russia in 1997, Canada in 2003, and Denmark in 2004. The U.S., which initially had strong objections to the UNCLOS, has now signed, but not ratified it. (This is a difficulty, as we shall see.)

Competing claims – The U.S.

The principal differences between Canada and the U.S. in the Arctic are the boundary between their sectors, and the status of the Northwest Passage. As noted above, the Canadian position is that the boundary should follow the 141 degree line of longitude. The U.S. government, however, bends the western offshore boundary eastwards along the median line between the two territories, conveniently capturing a 2,700 square mile area of the fuel-rich Beaufort Sea. Neither is there agreement how much of the continental shelf to the west of Canada’s Arctic archipelago belongs to Canada, and how much to the U.S. Importantly, along with other major maritime nations, the U.S. also rejects Canada’s assertion that parts of the Northwest Passage are Canadian Internal Waters, through which non-Canadian vessels must seek Ottawa’s permission to traverse – should a warming trend make that physically possible on a frequent basis. Rather, the U.S. regards it as an international strait: non-Canadian vessels would have right of transit* passage, though Canada could legally apply the provisions of the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act, and regulate fishing and shipping safety regulations. The U.S. would certainly point to the Manhattan and Polar Sea voyages as precedent-setting.

* In strait transit passage, all vessels travel in their normal mode, that is submarines under water.

Competing claims – Denmark

In the eastern Arctic, Denmark claims tiny Hans Island, a piece of forlorn rock in the Nares Strait between Ellesmere Island and Greenland. Ottawa considers it Canadian territory, but as the Canadian Press reported in 2007, now concedes that according to satellite imagery, the border between Canadian and Danish territory runs right through the middle of the island.
That has not changed the Canadian position.

Every few years, and over Ottawa’s protests, the Danes raise their flag on Hans Island. In return, Canadian officials, recently then-defence minister Bill Graham in 2005 for instance, briefly set foot on the island to accuse the Danes of trespass. At stake are minerals perhaps, and the right to control navigation.

Competing claims – Russia

Meanwhile, Russian and Canadian claims overlap near the North Pole. The key to Russian claims is the Lomonosov Ridge, a 1,000-mile underwater mountain chain. Rising 10,000 feet above the abyssal floor of the Arctic Ocean, it would be one of the world’s spectacular sights, were it above sea level.In December 2001, Russia submitted its first Arctic claim under the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf. Arguing that the Lomonosov Ridge was an extension of the Eurasian land mass, Russia claimed a large part of the Arctic, including the North Pole. The UN commission neither accepted the Russian position nor rejected it. Instead, it asked for further study.

It should be conceded that the Russians, who have a long history of Arctic exploration, appear to be making every effort to comply. The flag-planting episode referred to earlier was just the photo-op part of what was in fact a well-organized scientific expedition aimed at proving the geological continuity of the Lomonosov Ridge with Eurasia.

A Russian claim to large tracts of the Arctic presents two particular concerns for Canada.
One is ensuring the Russians do not receive what may be rightfully Canadian. Earlier this year, the Russian government offered evidence that not only is the Lomonosov Ridge part of Eurasia, but that it terminates not far from the northern tip of Ellesmere Island – well across the North Pole. Russian claims have never extended out of their hemisphere, yet the implications of this evidence are obvious. Of course we do not yet know what our claim will be. But it looks as though we shall be in dispute.

The second concern is that the Russian leadership does not try to drive a wedge between Canada and the U.S. Unfortunately, it is not entirely in Canadian hands to prevent. Although U.S. objections to UNCLOS have now been resolved, and President George W. Bush has urged ratification upon the Senate, that has yet to be done.

The problem here is that boundary negotiations are supposed to begin in 2013, hence the fast pace of Russian exploration, and latterly Canada’s. However, unless the U.S. ratifies the UNCLOS by then, it won’t be at the table. Canada’s dilemma is that by joining the negotiations in 2013 without the U.S., Ottawa risks straining relations with Washington. This would not be helped by the likely easy acceptance by Russia of the status of the Northwest Passage as Canadian Internal Waters: Russia seeks a similar status for its own northern route. On the other hand, if Canada doesn’t enter negotiations in 2013, there’s the real risk Russia will act unilaterally, a fear only fed by Medvedev’s instruction to his security agencies to define a border, referred to above.

Russian paranoia

It is necessary to examine why Russia, unlike the U.S., Denmark or Norway, is really the only one of the Arctic states that appears to understand the importance of the Arctic, has become so insistent in its claims and therefore presents a larger challenge to Canadian interests than its other polar neighbours.

Part of it is recent history. When the Soviet Union’s national bankruptcy brought the Cold War to a close, it also deeply wounded a proud nation’s self esteem. No longer a super power, the Russians continued to seek consolation in nationalism, not unmixed with xenophobia. It is not true, as some aver, that the West – having won its point – abandoned Russia. In private conversation, U.S. State Department officials have contended that the opposite is true: Successive Russian governments strongly resisted earnest U.S. attempts to have the Kremlin develop closer ties to the West. Indeed, the widespread popularity of President Vladimir Putin is persuasive evidence that Russians generally take less satisfaction from western-style liberty, than national strength. Not to put too fine a point on it, placing a national symbol at the North Pole is a big deal on the Russian Main Street, Jeffersonian democracy is not.
Also driving Russian ambitions in the Arctic is the old Russian fear of being surrounded by enemies, and seeking buffers between them and itself.

To understand how the Russians see things one really needs a globe, rather than the Mercator projection with its east-west orientation. Then, it is immediately obvious why Russia’s Tsars, commissars and now its post-Communist authoritarians have all been paranoid about being surrounded on the world island by potential enemies to the west, south and east of them.
And in the north: Even after 40 years of the Cold War, it is not widely appreciated among the general public just how close Russia is to North America.

The Canadian military outpost of Alert lies north of the 82nd parallel. From there, it’s only about 950 miles across the North Pole to Nagurskaya, in Russia’s most northerly extremity of Franz Josef Land – a two-hour flight. Indeed, from Alert, it’s only 250 miles further to Moscow, than it is to Ottawa. (2,600 miles.)

If the Arctic is to become even partially navigable, it is no longer the frozen obstacle to northern intrusion it once was.

National pride and paranoia then, fuel Russia’s Arctic assertiveness, including a resumption of the Cold War probing of Canadian air space, and its penchant for patriotic, if theatrical, demonstrations of practical prowess that it can do things in polar regions, that Canada can neither prevent nor emulate.

It is, thus entirely conceivable that Canadian interests and those of Russia will butt up against each other at the top of the world. While the Russians are presently committed to the UN’s process of peaceful resolution, the Kremlin’s August 2008 adventure in prospective NATO member Georgia, and its use of energy to coerce Ukraine – also with aspirations to enter NATO – in 2006, should be considered instructive. Such conduct makes the priorities and character of the leadership obvious – and while all that may be over the pole in Europe, what is the message Canadians are supposed to take from the resumption of Russian probing of their air space, something not seen since the Cold War?

Clearly, a Russia recently empowered by resource wealth, much of which is expected to come from the north, is once more flexing its muscles and reverting to a traditional policy of maintaining geographical buffers between itself and the rest of the world. Thanks to changing climatic conditions, that now includes a forward strategy in the Arctic.

Canada’s Response

Nobody seriously suggests that Canada should resort to gunboat diplomacy to enforce its territorial claims in the Arctic. Nevertheless, Foreign Affairs minister Peter Mackay’s insouciant response to the Russian placement of a marker on the seabed at the North Pole, mocked an action this country could neither prevent, nor emulate.

In fact, Canada is unable to track the movements of foreign submarines either, and in one notorious 1999 incident, even a Chinese research vessel surprised the residents of Tuktoyaktuk by its unannounced arrival from the west.

Without adequate surveillance, and the capacity to respond to what such surveillance might reveal, Canada’s grip on its Arctic rests more on the consent of its neighbours than upon its own strength.

To be sure, the present Conservative government has made significant announcements which, if fully acted upon, represent excellent first steps. However, if Canada is to be more than sovereign in name only, Canadians should be demanding a comprehensive response in four areas: diplomatic, scientific, commercial, and military.

Diplomatic

The Canadian Arctic claim must be clear. Does this country assert a sectoral claim, that pie-shaped slice with its point at 90 degrees north? Or does it claim a more modest area, based upon the best combination of the baselines enclosing the Arctic Archipelago, and the sketchily known extent of its continental shelf – which by law is all that it can claim?

The Mulroney-era declaration of baselines should be considered a bare minimum.

The Trudeau administration’s Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act defines Canada’s Arctic waters more extensively as those “adjacent to the mainland and islands of the Canadian Arctic within the area enclosed by the sixtieth parallel of north latitude, the one hundred and forty-first meridian of west longitude and a line measured seaward from the nearest Canadian land a distance of one hundred nautical miles, except that in the area between the islands of the Canadian arctic and Greenland, where the line of equidistance between the islands of the Canadian arctic and Greenland is less than one hundred nautical miles from the nearest Canadian land, that line shall be substituted for the line measured seaward one hundred nautical miles from the nearest Canadian land.”

But, as recently as October of 2006, the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence published a map in its report ‘Managing Turmoil,’ showing an unmistakable and patriotic sectoral approach as assumed in Canada since the 19th century. Apparently, Foreign Affairs Minister Mackay was of the same mind: Reacting to the Russian marker at the North Pole in 2007, he said, “There is no question over Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic . . . We established a long time ago that these are Canadian waters and this is Canadian property.”

Which is it?

Ambiguous claims are the easiest to knock down. This must be resolved before UNCLOS negotiations begin in 2013.

Scientific

Given the massive documentation Russia is assembling about the Arctic seabed, mapping the geography and extent of the continental shelf is key to validating an effective Canadian claim.
There remains much to be done. Dr Jacob Verhoef, the Halifax-based director of Natural Resources Canada’s Atlantic division, who leads Canadian Arctic research, was quoted in June this year, that “Presently, we do not have enough information about the depth structure of that [Lomonosov Ridge] to say how far it can used,” for Canada’s UNCLOS submission. “Once all the information has been collected, our outer limit could abut with that of Russia, or there could be a gap in between or we could have an overlap. It all depends on our data.”

However, Verhoef said Canadian researchers had “very positive” evidence that the ridge was “natural prolongation” of the North American continent.

Theoretically, Verhoef added, if the Lomonosov Ridge connects to North America, then Canada could justify a claim beyond the North Pole.

But of course, so could Russia.

Clearly, scientific precision is the midwife of peaceable agreement.

So far, apart from Verhoef’s researches and a $150 million contribution for scientific research to coincide with the International Polar Year, Ottawa has committed itself to reopening and expanding a deepwater port at the site of a disused mine at Nanisivik on Baffin Island near the entrance to the Northwest Passage, and establishing a state-of-the-art research station.

Commercial

Prime Minster Stephen Harper also took the opportunity of an Arctic visit shortly before he called the 2008 election, to announce a $100 million plan of geo-mapping to find valuable mineral deposits. “Managed properly,” he said, “Canada’s share of this incredible [Arctic] endowment will fuel the prosperity of the country for generations.” (11)

Military

The government also intends to build up to eight Arctic Offshore Patrol Ships, armed with a token 40mm Bofors, and based at Nanisivik. The ships are supposed to be able to operate in moderate (first year) ice. They will be used (among other things) to enforce Canadian sovereignty, such as a requirement (also mentioned by Harper on his Arctic visit) that foreign vessels transiting the Northwest Passage must seek clearance from federal agencies.

Additionally, the government has announced an Arctic combat training centre for Resolute, as well as reinforcements for the Canadian Rangers, a partly Inuit patrol force.

What next?

All of this represents a significant advance on anything that has been done before. Nevertheless, the maturation of Canadian Arctic policy further requires:

· Icebreakers capable of negotiating the heaviest ice. (The Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence recommends three.)

· A network of underwater listening devices, to detect ship movements in sensitive areas.n Coastguard ships equipped to deal with pollution emergencies.n Extended radar coverage for Canadian airspace to the pole.
· More long-range patrol aircraft.
· Expanded satellite surveillance. A minimum of five satellites should be placed in orbit.
· Expanded search and rescue capacity as Arctic traffic increases.n As a further indication of the priority Canada attaches to its far north, serious consideration should be given to detaching responsibility for the Arctic from Indian Affairs and Northern Development, and placed instead with a stand-alone ministry.
· Ottawa should certainly be less dismissive of symbolism: Archaic as they may seem, flag-raisings and evidences of occupation or exploration* may be tie-breakers when international tribunals consider competing claims. When dealing with Russia, a country for whom symbolism is evidently meaningful and which could hardly have been clearer about its northern ambitions, no source of legitimacy should be overlooked.
· Canada should take a strong leadership role in the circumpolar world.
· Canada should urge the next U.S. administration to ratify the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.

Conclusion : Ending Arctic Neglect

After more than a century of Arctic neglect, events have forced action upon Canada. Now, it all comes down to the necessity of a convincing demonstration of national will.

Prime Minister Stephen Harper has said that Canada must use its Arctic, or lose it: The measures he has already announced are a minimum to keep it in the game. Those recommended are essential if Canada’s capacity to actually exercise sovereignty is to be recognized by other countries.

And, the game is hardball. No doubt things can and will be worked out with the Danes and the Americans, through international courts and tribunals. But, of a resurgent and assertive Russia, no such comfortable assurances are justified.

This country has just a few years to prepare itself for complex negotiations with Russia.

It will need precise, substantiated territorial claims.

It must also immediately fashion the modest cudgel – ships and aircraft – necessary to arrest at least trivial incursions upon those claims, from wherever they come.

The old Canadian way, that moral suasion sometimes described as soft power, is insufficient to the needs of the day. In a most literal sense, possession of the true north will require an unprecedented standing on guard from Canadians.

–

Nigel Hannaford is a member of the Calgary Herald editorial board, and has been in the newspaper business for 31 years as editor, publisher and regional manager in British Columbia community newspapers before joining the Herald in 1999.

Footnotes

(1) Russian leader pushed for Arctic boundaries. A8. National Post, September 18, 2008.

(2) A system of radar stations to detect incoming Russian bombers or missiles that was, despite cosmetic deferences to Canadian sovereignty, an all-American effort. As in the later (2000) case of Ballistic Missile Defence, Ottawa was asked to participate, but declined.

(3) Manhattan was accompanied by the Canadian icebreaker John A. MacDonald, upon whose assistance it depended to proceed, during one part of the journey. Manhattan returned with a cargo of one symbolic barrel of oil. (There was also a U.S. icebreaker in attendance.)

(4) The Canadian Way, by Ivan Head and Pierre Elliot Trudeau. (McClelland & Stewart, 1995.) P.64.

(5) The Department of National Defence has an extensive photo-file of Minister Danson’s overflight of the Russian research station NP-22, taken 9/30/1977. The incident is also referenced by Franklyn Griffiths in “A Northern Foreign Policy,” published 1979 by the Canadian Institute of International Affairs. P.26.)

(6) Study discovers drastic thinning in Arctic Ice. A8, Calgary Herald, August 6, 2008.

(7) Canada renews claim to icy island. Alexander Panetta. A19. Calgary Herald. July 23, 2005.

(8) Several. For instance, “Foreigners could raid our Arctic resources, Defence warns: From fish to water.” David Pugliese, A4. National Post Dec 7, 2000.

(9) Russia plants flag on Arctic sea floor; ‘Just a show’ MacKay. A1. National Post, August 3, 2007.

(10) Canada’s Arctic sovereignty bid begins in ‘busy place,’ China, Japan, U.S., Germany in area of mapping effort. A8, National Post, August 22, 2008.

(11) Russia’s Arctic talks echo PM’s August blitz: Area must become Russia’s main strategic resource base.” Randy Boswell. A17. National Post. September 13, 2008.