Ethelred the Unready, King of England at the turn of the 10th Century, wasn’t just lacking in preparedness. He was also slow to figure things out. In AD 991, his kingdom was again visited by Viking raiders who’d repeatedly pillaged the English coast. This time, however, the invaders from Denmark said they could be convinced to turn around and go home if they were given a “geld”, or tribute, of ₤10,000 in gold and silver. Ethelred took them up on their offer and paid the geld.
Three years later the Danes returned – this time demanding ₤16,000 to go away. Which was again paid. By AD 1002, the payment was up to ₤24,000, and then ₤36,000 five years after that. The futility of Ethelred’s attempts to make his problems go away by repeatedly caving to his attackers’ demands led Victorian-era poet Rudyard Kipling to pen his oft-quoted line, “That if once you have paid him the Dane-geld; You never get rid of the Dane.”

A recent legal decision from the British Columbia Supreme Court brings to mind Kipling’s warning. As regular C2C Journal readers know, B.C. leads the country in court decisions and government policies that seek to achieve “reconciliation” by acceding to whatever radical demands are made by Indigenous groups. The key feature of this process – unending acquiescence via court rulings, legislation, policy and “nation-to-nation” agreements, many of them hashed out in secret and later sprung on a citizenry that had no say in the matter – has become like a modern form of Dane-geld. And with the same unfortunate result.
As King Ethelred discovered, whatever you pay is never enough. Rather, each “payment” of legal and/or public-policy tribute provokes still greater demands in the future while eroding Canada’s negotiating position the next time around. All of which is causing the slow-motion destruction of our economic and social wellbeing and the diminution of Canada’s national sovereignty.
The most damaging legislative example of this process has been the enshrining of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) into B.C. and federal law. But B.C. courts have wrought their own havoc with bizarre decisions that weaken key economic and legal precepts. They have tossed aside the key modern-day principle of state neutrality in religion by approving mandatory native spirituality ceremonies in public schools. Provincial judges have also ruled that the normal progress of civilization can be considered a treaty violation and that imaginary “supernatural dens” can be considered an objective reality sufficient to upend provincial laws. Even more significantly, the now-notorious 2025 Cowichan ruling revealed that fee-simple land ownership, the bedrock of Canadians’ property rights, can be pushed aside by aboriginal title on the strength of mere historical hearsay and second-hand notes.
As if all of this weren’t enough, now comes another cataclysmic threat to the coherence of Canada’s legal system: the case known as Metlakatla First Nation v. Prince Rupert Port Authority. Here the courts appear ready to erase another fundamental aspect of economic life in Canada – the sanctity of contract law. Though it concerned only a jurisdictional matter rather than settling the overall dispute, the January 2026 decision could prove to be Canada’s most dangerous Dane-geld yet.
Payment Due
The Metlakatla First Nation (MFN) is one of over 200 Indigenous communities in B.C. In 2021, it had a population of just 1,102 people living near the port city of Prince Rupert. Despite its tiny size, provincial and federal laws requiring a duty to “consult and accommodate” plus the ever-evolving concept of aboriginal title have given the Metlakatla a functional veto over resource development throughout their “traditional territory” that covers a vast swath – as much as 200,000 square km – of northern B.C.
The MFN exploits its hammerlock by demanding what amounts to Dane-geld from local resource projects. The tribute can take many forms: outright cash payments, job or contract guarantees, equity interests and other financial payments and/or benefits. For those who choose not to pay, the MFN makes frequent use of the courts and a cadre of expensive Vancouver lawyers who can delay or stymie any developer foolish enough to deny their clients their geld.
No resource project in the area can proceed without some form of payment to the Metlakatla from taxpayers and/or industry. While some celebrate this as supporting Indigenous reconciliation, what it really means is that the tribe exercises discretionary control over the Crown’s interests in the province.
As described on the province’s official MFN website, the tribe has signed numerous agreements giving it a lucrative slice of resource and energy projects in the Prince Rupert area. The 2025 Metlakatla Forest & Range Consultation and Revenue Sharing Agreement, for example, provides an annual payment of $453,000 plus another $35,000 for “capacity funding” to the MFN from provincial taxpayers simply for allowing others to harvest trees in its neighbourhood. The Metlakatla Natural Gas Pipeline Benefits Agreement will pay the First Nation $2.15 million upon completion of the planned Prince Rupert Gas Transmission pipeline. The 2016 Metlakatla LNG Coastal Fund Benefits agreement triggered $1.5 million in provincial funding when the Kitimat-based LNG Canada project was completed last year. And so on.
The record demonstrates that no resource project in the area can proceed without some form of payment to the MFN being made by taxpayers and/or industry. While some acknowledge or even celebrate this as supporting Indigenous reconciliation, what it really means is that the tribe – and effectively all of B.C.’s First Nations – exercise discretionary control over the Crown’s interests in the province. If a government needs to ask permission from another group to do anything on its lands, then it is not the sovereign master of its own house. It might not even own that house. The implications could hardly be more profound.
Even Global Commodities Giants Should Read the Fine Print
The current lawsuit concerns the operation of the Prince Rupert Port Authority (PRPA), incorporated by the federal government in 1997 to own and operate the port of Prince Rupert. While it is a Crown corporation, when the PRPA enters into negotiations with its tenants regarding the movement of cargo or any other activity on its property, it does so as a normal, private commercial actor.
In 2015, the PRPA entered into a development agreement with Vopak Development Canada Inc., (a subsidiary of Holland-based Royal Vopak, a global provider of port infrastructure) and Calgary-based AltaGas Ltd. The two companies plan to jointly build and run Ridley Island Energy Export Facility, or REEF, on the PRPA premises. REEF is intended to export valuable petroleum derivatives to growing Asian markets, primarily liquefied petroleum gas (LPG or propane), as well as butane, methanol and diesel fuel.
As part of its deal with the port authority, REEF negotiated exclusive rights to handle propane at Prince Rupert. As is common commercial practice, the specifics of this monopoly arrangement, as well as the rest of the deal, were confidential. In mid-2024, after the project received all necessary federal and provincial approvals, the proponents made their final investment decision to proceed. REEF is scheduled to begin operating next year. Total cost: $1.3 billion.

In another common commercial practice, in 2018, the PRPA and REEF began consultations with native groups that might be affected by their plans. This is mandated by jurisprudence which reads this obligation into Canada’s Constitution Act, 1982. Lasting five years, the consultations resulted in an impact benefit agreement for the MFN. While that deal’s size and terms remain confidential, REEF says it has provided a combined $350 million in economic benefits to the six First Nations involved in the project.
Separately from the REEF project, in December 2019 the Government of Canada sold the bulk cargo export facility Ridley Terminals, a longstanding tenant at the Prince Rupert port, to an Australian subsidiary of American Metals & Coal International, Inc. (AMCI) and Riverstone Holdings LLC, a New York-based private equity firm. Ridley Terminals was later renamed Trigon Pacific Terminals Limited. Under the deal, Trigon’s lease with the port limited it to exporting specific, listed commodities such as coal and coke, which were then its core business.
LPG was not on the lease’s list of approved products. To handle LPG, Trigon would need explicit permission from the PRPA, the port’s owner. It is difficult to envision how the two purchasing firms, global giants with teams of high-priced international lawyers, could have remained unaware of this critical provision throughout their due diligence process preceding the 2019 purchase.
What is the Cowichan Decision, and why does it matter for the contract law Canada relies upon for commercial certainty?
The Cowichan decision, a highly controversial 2025 British Columbia Supreme Court ruling, found that aboriginal title is a prior and superior right to fee-simple land ownership. This upended centuries of legal certainty about property rights in Canada and has caused great confusion and concern throughout the province. The contract law Canada relies upon requires a similar sense of certainty and it is now under similar attack. A January 2026 B.C. Supreme Court ruling allowed the Metlakatla First Nation to proceed with a lawsuit claiming its aboriginal rights override a valid commercial contract between the Prince Rupert Port Authority and an energy company. Together, these decisions reveal a troubling pattern of dismantling foundational Western legal principles in favour of expanding Indigenous claims.
The formation of Trigon itself was a form of Dane-geld, as the MFN and the nearby Lax Kw’alaams bands each received a free five percent equity interest in Trigon, making them partners in the project – a move that would prove propitious. In 2023, Trigon asked the PRPA to amend its permitted use list to include LPG. This was a matter of some urgency, given an announcement by the Liberal government of Justin Trudeau that it intended to ban Canadian exports of thermal coal by 2030 – potentially devastating Trigon’s core business. Because of its previous export monopoly agreement with REEF, however, the PRPA quite properly refused Trigon’s request. At which point the legal fireworks began.
What Part of “Contract” Don’t You Understand?
After being rebuffed in its initial effort to get into the LPG business, Trigon and its new partner MFN launched a two-pronged strategy to become a competitor to REEF. First, in late 2023, Trigon sued the PRPA seeking to have REEF’s LPG export monopoly declared illegitimate, a legal action that appears more strategic than practical. The following year, the MFN raised the spectre of aboriginal rights by suing the PRPA, claiming damages for “failing to adequately consult” with it on the LPG project. Specifically, the Metlakatla claim the port authority as an agent of the federal Crown had a fiduciary obligation to disclose the existence of its confidential export agreement with REEF as part of its five-year-long native consultation process. This second lawsuit raises some very serious concerns.

The MFN claims it would never have consented to the REEF project had it known about the monopoly provision. Bringing aboriginal law into the case, the MFN asserted that the PRPA’s duty, as an agent of the federal Crown, to consult and accommodate the MFN required it to reveal the terms of the REEF deal – even though this would have caused the PRPA to breach its contract with REEF. The MFN is basically saying that a duty to consult overrides any contractual obligations a Crown corporation may have with any other non-native organization or business.
In May 2024, notwithstanding the ongoing lawsuits, REEF announced it was proceeding with its fully-approved project. Meanwhile, despite having no authority or permission to handle LPG, Trigon barged ahead with plans for its own $750 million LPG facility at the port. Trigon also engaged in an unsuccessful public relations effort to get the federal Liberals to force the PRPA to reverse its decision and allow Trigon to handle LPG. Again, this despite the Prince Rupert facility having an unambiguous and perfectly legal contract with REEF on this matter. Trigon’s website, incidentally, brusquely bills the company as an LPG exporter.
As Trigon’s multi-pronged attack turns on the confidentiality of REEF’s monopoly clause with the PRPA, it is significant that when Trigon tried to get an unredacted copy of the agreement, it was rebuffed in a B.C. court and then again on appeal. The Court of Appeal for B.C. held that releasing the document would “harm” REEF’s commercial interests by providing a competitor with “a ‘window’ into its project management system and highly confidential information.” This ruling by the province’s highest court supports the sanctity and confidentiality of REEF’s contract. As such, it appears to undermine Trigon’s original lawsuit seeking to effectively nullify that agreement. (Trigon has since sought leave to appeal that decision to the Supreme Court of Canada.)
Freedom of contract – the liberty for two parties to come to a mutually beneficial agreement – is fundamental to the healthy working of our entire economic system and, thus, a matter of paramount public interest.
With all this in mind, the PRPA quite reasonably brought a motion to dismiss the Metlakatla’s lawsuit without need for any courtroom time. In its January 2026 ruling on this matter, however, the B.C. Supreme Court tossed centuries of contractual certitude aside by ruling that the case could proceed to trial. While one arm of the court has said the contract must not be revealed because it is valid and enforceable, another – and lower – part of B.C.’s judiciary subsequently signalled an apparent willingness to contemplate blowing up contract law entirely once aboriginal title and the federal “duty to consult” come into play.
Freedom of Contract
The author’s copy of the widely-used law school textbook, Anson’s Law of Contracts, begins by stating, “Contract law is the child of commerce, and has grown with the growth of the country…Contract law does not lay down a number of rights and duties which the law will enforce; it consists rather of a number of limiting principles, subject to which the parties may create rights and duties for themselves which the law will uphold. The parties to a contract, in a sense, make the law for themselves.”
Examples of Anson’s “limiting principles” are contracts and contract terms made illegal by statute, such as minimum wage prescriptions, landlord and tenant rules, competition law and human rights protections. Contracts can also be made unenforceable by common law, including via cases of fraud, mutual mistake, incapacity, breach of trust or by promoting an activity that is immoral or contrary to public policy. Outside of these limiting principles, however, the broad liberties that freedom of contract allows two or more parties to enter into mutually beneficial agreements have made it fundamental to the healthy functioning of our entire economic system – and, thus, a matter of paramount public interest.

The Crown’s duty to consult is a much more recent innovation, established via Supreme Court precedents that greatly expanded the meaning of the simple and clear wording of Section 35(1) of the Constitution. The duty to consult arises when a government has knowledge of the potential existence of an aboriginal right or title and is contemplating an action that might adversely affect it. This triggers a related doctrine, the “Honour of the Crown”, also manufactured by Canada’s courts, that requires accommodating a particular aboriginal right or title.
Why is freedom of contract fundamental to the Canadian economy, and what is at stake in the Metlakatla vs. Prince Rupert Port Authority case?
Freedom of contract refers to the right of two or more parties to reach a mutually beneficial agreement within the broad principles of contract law. This longstanding liberty is fundamental to the functioning of Canada’s entire economic system and is a matter of paramount public interest. When courts signal a willingness to nullify valid contracts on the basis of aboriginal rights claims, it sends a message to investors around the world that signed agreements cannot be trusted in Canada. In the case known as Metlakatla First Nation v. Prince Rupert Port Authority, a $1.3 billion energy-export project fully approved by federal and provincial authorities is being held hostage by a First Nation that had already accepted substantial economic benefits from the project before withdrawing its support to seek a better deal with a competitor.
Indigenous rights proponents will argue that once aboriginal title is recognized or ceded, the Crown must vacate the jurisdictional space and allow native law to govern, giving the title-holder exclusive right to use and control the land. This has been argued in relation to the recent “Rising Tide” Haida Title Lands Agreement concerning B.C.’s former Queen Charlotte Islands. From this perspective, the new titleholder need not be bound by any agreements made by the previous occupiers – which quite likely could include legal contracts.
It appears this is what the MFN has in mind with its case against the PRPA. The MFN is arguing that the REEF export monopoly limits the First Nation’s prospective aboriginal title-based right to maximize the economic value of its territory and, therefore, must be set aside. Similar to other B.C. court rulings in recent years that have stretched legal definitions and processes to give native claimants a leg up in court proceedings, B.C. Supreme Court Judge Edlyn Laurie, overseeing motions in the case, responded downright eagerly to the MFN’s assertion of aboriginal title over the lands and waters of the Port of Prince Rupert as a matter of law. “Metlakatla was entitled to the deepest possible level of consultation,” she declared. Such a position is deeply problematic for all Canadians.
To drive home the seriousness of its claim, on February 4, 2026 the MFN announced what can only be considered the “nuclear option” of Indigenous resource disputes. It claimed it was immediately withdrawing its previously granted consent for REEF’s LPG project and would henceforth refuse to consent to any future permits or consultations required by either the PRPA or REEF. The MFN is essentially saying it intends to hold the entire port facility hostage until it gets what it wants. Contract law be damned.
Fair Dealing? Never Heard of It
In a typical fiduciary relationship, a dominant party dealing with a deemed vulnerable and dependent “inferior party”, also known as “the beneficiary”, must always prefer the best interests of the other party to its own. The Crown’s special fiduciary obligation vis-à-vis aboriginals was developed by the courts to address the historic imbalance in bargaining power in Crown-aboriginal dealings regarding treaties and land claims – what have always been considered core aboriginal matters.
The REEF project, on the other hand, is a distinctly modern, sophisticated, commercial bargaining situation. This is, perhaps unwittingly, reflected in the MFN’s legal claim, which alleges that the PRPA wrongfully disregarded the MFN’s “derivative economic rights”. And as the various impact and benefit agreements described above disclose, the band is an experienced player in the Dane-geld business. It had access to top lawyers, accountants and other advisors throughout the consultation period. There is no factual basis to apply a fiduciary principle in this case. The MFN signed business agreements with its eyes wide open and with the benefit of sophisticated, independent legal advice. Basic business morality demands that they stick to the bargain they signed.
Nonetheless, in its lawsuit the MFN claims this fiduciary element of Crown-aboriginal dealings obligated the PRPA to act exclusively in the best interests of the Metlakatla throughout the five years of consultations regarding the REEF project, and therefore sacrifice its own substantial commercial interests. In effect, the MFN is arguing, absurdly, it would seem, that any negotiation involving a Crown-owned entity and a potential native interest must always be resolved to the complete satisfaction of the native party, regardless of the legal consequences or temporal impossibilities.

The MFN lawsuit, for example, asserts that during the early phase of the consultation prior to the creation of Trigon, the PRPA’s duty included imagining that Trigon or something like it might eventually appear on the scene and might want to handle LPG. And that this should have triggered a deal that would have been potentially advantageous to the MFN, if such a thing ever came about. Then, once Trigon appeared and handed a five percent equity share to the MFN, the PRPA’s consultation duty shifted to speculating that Trigon might want to handle LPG and thus figuring out how that could be done so as to provide a benefit to the MFN.
Merely stating the essence of the MFN’s lawsuit in this way reveals the vast unreasonableness of its claims. Nowhere is there any indication that Trigon or the MFN ever wondered about exporting LPG until late 2023, well after the MFN declared it was satisfied with the five-year-long federal consultation process and had accepted its share of REEF’s Dane-geld.
Seemingly to bolster this far-fetched scenario, the MFN has latterly advanced a claim of aboriginal title as well. But the absence of any claim during the consultation period told the PRPA all it could have reasonably known about this issue: that there was nothing to know. Further, given the general understanding of aboriginal rights at the time, it is ridiculous to suggest the PRPA should have considered, let alone dealt advantageously in the MFN’s favour, with the idea that this small First Nation would want to get into the propane-exporting business.
If contracts are the children of commerce, then trust is the DNA. All parties have an ingrained duty to carry out their parts of any contract in good faith. By withdrawing support for REEF after having concluded the deal, the MFN is acting in a morally repugnant and untrustworthy manner.
Aboriginal rights “recognized and affirmed” by Section 35 of the Constitution are generally understood to be rights existing at the time of the first assertion of Crown sovereignty, which in B.C. is 1846. Obviously, nobody was then engaged in the handling of LPG, so no aboriginal rights have ever arisen in relation to it. Also significant is that the MFN has not actually sued for a declaration of an aboriginal right to export LPG. Such a legal process would likely take a dozen or more years and cost millions of dollars. Further, given the huge and angry reaction to the recent Cowichan decision, First Nations advancing these claims can expect fiercer legal resistance these days.
So instead of risking its own time and money in seeking a declaration of aboriginal title to get into the LPG business, the MFN’s lawsuit merely asserts its precedent-making claim to aboriginal title in a passing fashion in a lawsuit based on the issue of fiduciary duty. And in response, Motions Judge Laurie seems to have leapt at the chance to break new legal ground. The entire argument is best regarded as a trial balloon. And as such, it deserves to be punctured as swiftly as possible.
How is the aboriginal title BC courts have recognized being used to challenge private commercial contracts?
Court decisions during the 2020s have recognized aspects of aboriginal title in British Columbia that extend far beyond their original purpose of protecting historic Indigenous land use rights. With the Metlakatla First Nation v. Prince Rupert Port Authority case (ongoing as of spring 2026), aboriginal title is being used to challenge a valid commercial contract. The Metlakatla First Nation asserts that its aboriginal title over the Prince Rupert area requires a federally owned port authority to disclose the confidential terms of a private energy-export contract it signed in 2015, even though doing so would place the port authority in breach of its contractual obligations. In January 2026, a B.C. judge allowed this lawsuit to proceed, declaring that the First Nation was entitled to “the deepest possible level of consultation” in a case that is clearly just a commercial matter.
The Honour of the Native Community?
If contracts are the children of commerce, then trust is the DNA. All parties have an ingrained duty to carry out their parts of a contract in good faith, having regard for the reasonable expectations of the other parties. By withdrawing support for REEF after having concluded the deal and initially provided support, the MFN is acting in a morally repugnant and untrustworthy manner. It also opens itself up to being counter-sued by either the PRPA or REEF. The MFN has essentially double-crossed both parties in favour of Trigon and its presumably better offer. And having put itself in such a conflict of interest, the MFN has also breached its Dane-geld agreements and should be required to give back all that lucre.
Honour for all: While Canadian governments are bound by the “Honour of the Crown” in their dealings with native groups, an equivalent responsibility should be expected of Indigenous business interests when dealing with the rest of Canada. Shown, Treaty Number Seven, by Bruce A. Stapleton, circa 1876. (Source of image: Saskatoon Public Library Local History Room/Glenbow-Alberta Archives, NA-40-1; colourization by ChatGPT)Despite such solid legal logic, however, it seems unlikely the Metlakatla will ever face any negative consequences for their actions. Given other recent B.C. court decisions that defy precedent and common sense, there’s a reasonable chance they’ll actually succeed in rewriting contract law. That is certainly implied by the recent court decision allowing the case to proceed to trial. And the “nuclear” threat to block all subsequent consultations with REEF for possible expansions and other changes could even have a good chance of paying off in terms of additional Dane-geld down the road.
But even if all this is successful in the short-term, what are the long-term consequences of this behaviour? By acting in such a discreditable manner, the MFN – and by extension all First Nations – are undermining their own claims to legitimacy. If one of the main goals of Indigenous reconciliation is to integrate and embed native interests into Canadian economic development, then native partners have a responsibility to act in a reliable and trustworthy manner. To this end, they should regard business contracts to be as sacred and inviolable as the treaties they once signed with the federal government.

If the “Honour of the Crown” is triggered by a signature on parchment, then shouldn’t the “Honour of the Native Community” similarly arise once consultations are concluded and agreements signed? If, instead, the MFN can convince a court that it holds aboriginal title over the export of propane and that such a thing supersedes all normal contract law, then what other legal innovations await potential investors? The invention of new forms of aboriginal title meant to deliver a temporary business advantage to a particular First Nation raises even more uncertainty throughout the resource industry – and puts future projects in peril.
Keep in mind that the players in this dispute include large multi-national corporations with global perspectives. Undermining contract law for domestic resource projects will send another signal to the rest of the world that Canada is not a reliable place to do business. If Indigenous Canadians wish to participate in the broader Canadian economy, they need to accept the rules that have been in place for centuries and which all other participants have already agreed upon. They can’t simply make up their own game.
Correcting this situation – which has implications for all of Canada – will require the efforts of all Canadians. In my many years as a lawyer, I came to realize that my most successful business clients were those whose word was as good as a signed contract. Again, trust is fundamental to prosperity and progress. If native businessmen and businesswomen cannot be taken at their word then it falls to the business community-at-large to push back against this behaviour. The most immediate corrective is to sue over breach of contract, as mentioned earlier. This should be encouraged.
But the rest of society has a role to play as well. All citizens must be able to exercise their freedom to publicly and explicitly criticize discreditable activity, regardless of the race of those engaged in it. Unfortunately, the societal norms of present-day Canada make it nearly impossible to call out this sort of conduct in the native community, particularly by the mainstream media. The Globe and Mail’s coverage of the REEF dispute is illustrative of this reluctance.
No part of the Metlakatla’s current attack on contract law would be countenanced by any Canadian court if the plaintiff seeking such a controversial outcome was of any race – black, Asian, Hispanic or, God forbid, white – other than aboriginal.
In an article on the MFN’s February 4 declaration of its “nuclear” intent, Canada’s self-declared “national newspaper” studiously avoids any mention of the disastrous implications of the band’s actions, framing them instead as yet another example of an intransigent federal government doing harm to native interests. “Metlakatla,” the Globe blandly claims, “is upset that the port authority has frozen out the First Nation and other Trigon partners in their bid to diversify into different commodities, notably propane and butane.” Promoting such an upside-down narrative in order to avoid calling out the discreditable and self-interested behaviour of Indigenous interests – behaviour that, in this instance, threatens to wipe out a whole category of Canadian law – infantilizes the entire native business community.
Finally, it is also time for the Canadian court system to contemplate the effects of its own campaign of continued indulgence towards the escalating demands of Indigenous organizations. Allowing the MFN lawsuit to proceed despite another, superior arm of the same court system already implicitly upholding the legality of the confidentiality clause at the nexus of this entire dispute, reveals the disregard with which the B.C. judiciary has come to treat foundational aspects of Western society. We are witnessing in real-time the destruction of the various definitions, boundaries, protocols and standards that make up modern Canada. And it is being carried out with a shocking carelessness towards what lies at the heart of this process – racial favouritism.
No part of this current attack on contract law would be countenanced by any Canadian court if the plaintiff seeking such a controversial outcome was of any race – black, Asian, Hispanic or, God forbid, white – other than aboriginal. Together with all the other outrages and absurdities foisted upon the country by the court system, this latest example of racial discrimination is turning Canada into an unpredictable, unstable and untrustworthy place to live, work and invest.
Peter Best is a retired lawyer living in Sudbury, Ontario. He is the author of the 2020 book There Is No Difference: An Argument for the Abolition of the Indian Reserve System and Special Race-based Laws and Entitlements for Canada’s Indians, and a contributor to The 1867 Project: Why Canada Should Be Cherished – Not Cancelled.
Source of main image: ChatGPT.






