Every country has an army, theirs or someone else’s.
—Anonymous
Since the Confederation of Canada in 1867 there have been concerns about how the vast but underpopulated young nation would defend itself. Great Britain, the protector of the Canadian Colonies, wanted Canada to step up and become more responsible for its own defence. The United States, a growing challenger to the British Empire’s interests at the time, had just concluded a long and bloody civil war. One consequence of this was a large and battle-tested standing army to Canada’s south and a culture driven by the new doctrine of “Manifest Destiny” that had many Americans thinking their goal should be to own all of North America. The government of the nascent Dominion of Canada knew full-well that the United States presented an immediate and serious danger to its sovereignty.
Thus from Canada’s first days as a sovereign nation, geopolitics – the analysis of the geographical influences on power relationships among countries – offered the basis to begin what should have become a continuing discussion on national defence, which in turn would form one part of a comprehensive discussion on national security for the young nation.
National security encompasses much more than a country simply possessing armed forces. National security refers to a nation’s ability to preserve its physical integrity and territory; to maintain its economic relations with its neighbours and trading partners on reasonable terms; to preserve its nature, institutions and governance from disruption instigated from outside; and to control its borders.
A country’s national security does not exist internally in a vacuum, particularly for a democracy. It is one of the six national interests that are common to all modern-day countries, as defined in this presentation: unity, national security, good governance, protection of rights and freedoms, economic prosperity and growth, and personal wellbeing and quality of life. Each of these six national interests affects and is affected by all of the other national interests and, accordingly, need to be regarded by national leaders and informed citizens as a whole rather than individually. It is easy to see why: national security, for example, is positively or negatively influenced by the fortunes of the country’s economy and the state of the citizenry’s unity.
Equally important is understanding the depth and breadth of the requirements for achieving national security to a degree that guards against the sum of the nation’s external threats and internal threats and delivers its contribution to global stability. Policy and capabilities must be assembled to meet assessed national threats with commensurate intelligence services, border controls, immigration services, policing, defence forces, alliances and partnerships.
It is obvious that the geopolitics of 1867 and 2025 are different. While Canada’s location on the globe is the same, and while the U.S. hasn’t gone anywhere, the absolute and relative powers and the resulting relationships among countries have changed dramatically. As is often noted, the U.S. and Canada have the world’s longest undefended border, thanks to the dramatic shift in the first half of the 20th century from rivalry and fear to cooperation and friendship, resulting in closely aligned security, trading and cultural relationships that have lasted now for a century.
Our relationship with Great Britain, meanwhile, has become one based on two independent mature nations that remain friends and allies (never more so than during the Second World War, in which Canada contributed materially to the Allied victory over Germany, Japan and Italy). Our relationship with other Western democracies has also matured from a junior status of “former British colony” into an ally and partner. This has been based on Canada’s democratic principles, economic significance, favoured destination for many countries’ emigrants, and successive military accomplishments including in the first and second world wars, Korean War, Cold War, international peacekeeping and (much less significantly) international peacemaking coalitions.
All that stated, in the past nine years Canada’s position as a trusted ally and geopolitical partner has seriously eroded. Our counterparts have watched Canada increasingly fail to meet the requirements of various formal and informal agreements, if not ignore them altogether. Our critical ally, largest trading partner and neighbour, the United States, has watched with growing and vocal concern.
In December 2024 we find ourselves in a far worse situation across all areas of national security than we did in 2015. The need for Canada to define its geopolitical position, based on clearly articulated national interests, has never been more important or urgent.
The Government of Canada’s near-complete inaction in response to the outrageous and damaging foreign interference provocations by numerous foreign entities but most obviously the Communist Party of China (CPC) has not gone unnoticed by our enemies and allies alike. Massive uncontrolled and undocumented immigration has seriously affected Canada’s security. The unrest in our streets from Hamas supporters, pro-Khalistan and other ethnic, sectarian and/or factional agitators, often-violent anti-Jewish demonstrators, gang crime and miscellaneous violent acts has demonstrated that Canada either does not take its domestic security seriously or is powerless to stop worsening instability. Our courts, police and border services appear almost impotent.
The informal but important America, Britain, Canada, Australia and New Zealand (ABCA) arrangement, which dates back to the Second World War and focuses on inter-operability of equipment and systems among the allied English-speaking countries, has taken to simply ignoring Canada over the past five years, while new security arrangements are launched that exclude Canada. The four other members of the critical “Five Eyes” intelligence-sharing community (which includes the same countries as ABCA) regard Canada with diminishing respect and trust. Watching all this, the incoming Donald Trump Administration has threatened severe actions, including steep tariffs on all Canadian imports.
Thus, in December 2024 we find ourselves in a far worse situation across all areas of national security than we did in 2015. The need for Canada to define its geopolitical position, based on clearly articulated national interests, has never been more important or urgent. A “rethink” of our national security should commence immediately, although it is more likely (and might even be preferable) were this to occur under a new government. A review of national defence policy and a focus on rebuilding capabilities should be an immediate and imperative part of the full national security policy review. If prompt and in some cases immediate action is not forthcoming, Canada will feel repercussions from its partners and allies.
The Shrinking of the Canadian Armed Forces
Canada has historically used analyses known as “White Papers” to evaluate policy options on a range of topics, including national defence. Defence white papers are supposed to define the geopolitical placement of our country and then set forth the full defence requirements needed to ensure our sovereignty along with the other elements of national security. Canada’s last three White Papers on Defence – in 1965, 1971 and 1994 – were produced by Liberal governments that in all three cases were seeking to downsize (or even eliminate) the military.
The most recent White Paper on Defence was written in 1994 by the government of Jean Chrétien, who was looking to save money by realizing what was then widely celebrated among Western countries as the “peace dividend” that was to follow the end of the Cold War. The U.S., which had spent most heavily on defence in the 1980s, was arguably in a position to ease back, as were some other NATO allies such as the soon-to-be-reunified West Germany.
Canada, however, had been a serious defence laggard for decades (though not quite as bad as Luxembourg or Iceland, which had no military at all except its coastguard), often spending barely one-third as much as the U.S. relative to its population and GDP, and never meeting the longstanding NATO guideline of devoting the equivalent of 2 percent of national GDP to defence. Canada’s NATO forces (which numbered around 10,000 stationed in West Germany through much of the Cold War) had become notorious for their outdated equipment and major gaps in capabilities, such as modern tanks, fighter jets and anti-aircraft missiles. The NATO spending guideline became official policy in 2006 and then an alliance-wide “pledge” in 2014 that most NATO countries had met by last year – but not Canada.
For such ill-equipped and undermanned countries, there was little left to cut, so there should be no “peace dividend” to claim. But some would try anyway. Accordingly, the already-depleted Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) were to be reduced even further – and rapidly. The reduction announced alongside the 1994 White Paper on Defence was that the CAF would shrink from 84,000 in the 1980s to a mere 60,000 personnel across all ranks in the Army, Navy and Air Force combined; rumours soon swirled of future cuts to as little as 40,000.
The 1994 White Paper’s introduction stated:
- “The primary obligation of the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces is to protect the country and its citizens from challenges to their security. In the final analysis, a nation not worth defending is a nation not worth preserving.
- The Government has just completed a comprehensive review of defence policy. In so doing, it fulfilled its commitment to wide-ranging consultations by involving Parliament and listening to the views of ordinary citizens, defence experts, disarmament advocates and non-governmental organizations…
- The consensus achieved on the way ahead for an effective, realistic and affordable policy calls for multi-purpose, combat-capable armed forces able to meet the challenges to Canada’s security both at home and abroad.” [Emphases added]
The statement, “A nation not worth defending is a nation not worth preserving,” shows the hypocrisy of the thinking underlying the White Paper at the time, but has since proved even more of a damning statement – considering Canada’s current state of national security.
The Chrétien government’s allegedly “realistic and affordable policy” that was developed with input from “disarmament advocates” and “non-government organizations” meant that the CAF was drastically cut, historical regiments were erased, badly needed new equipment was not procured, training was severely curtailed, major bases were closed, and the whole operational priority became UN peacekeeping. The entire force was soon demoralized.
It was now crystal-clear that Canada was no longer a reliable defence ally and partner, and that Canada not only was not meeting but did not intend ever to meet its NATO obligation of allocating 2 percent of the nation’s gross domestic product (GDP) to national defence. The CAF never recovered from the 1994 White Paper and its deep cuts. Spending fell from $11.4 billion or 1.96 percent of GDP in 1990 (under Progressive Conservative Prime Minister Brian Mulroney) to $8.3 billion or just 1.1 percent of GDP in 2000.
Yet while the Conservative government of Stephen Harper made some significant equipment purchases – such as strategic airlift and heavy-lift helicopters – neither his nor his predecessor’s government wrote a new White Paper on National Defence, something clearly needed with the changing geopolitical landscape.
The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks appeared to change all that. The Western world’s “holiday from history” came to an abrupt end as U.S. President George W. Bush stated plainly to the world’s countries, “Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists.” The Chrétien government, clearly rattled, joined the Global War on Terror and boosted defence spending primarily to carry out one mission, Canada’s combat deployment to Afghanistan.
Canada’s troops performed ably and with commitment in the difficult, often bloody, protracted and ultimately irresolute counter-insurgency. Canadians responded with pride and support. The Highway of Heroes reflected the citizenry’s support for their armed forces when their purpose and values are well-defined. Pride in Canada’s active role in global affairs seemed reaffirmed. Yet while the Conservative government of Stephen Harper made a number of significant equipment purchases – such as strategic airlift and heavy-lift helicopters – neither government made any attempt to write a new White Paper on National Defence, something clearly needed with the changing geopolitical landscape. Eventually Canada’s mission in Afghanistan came to an end and the CAF went into limbo, with the Harper government focused in its later years mainly on balancing the federal budget.
This made the rhetoric emanating from the Justin Trudeau Liberals in the 2015 election campaign all the more refreshing: they promised to invest in Canada’s national security, including specifically in the CAF. This would encompass everything, pledged Chrystia Freeland, Trudeau’s first Minister of International Trade, in a major foreign policy statement two years later, “from border security, to the defence of North America through NORAD, to the fight against [Islamist radicals], to our efforts within NATO, to nurturing and improving our trading relationship, which is the strongest in the world.” The next day Harjit Sajjan, Trudeau’s pick for Minister of Defence, announced the new defence policy: “Strong, Secure, Engaged”. Canada was to be strong at home, secure in North America and engaged in the world.
These priorities were little different from those of previous governments; the important thing would be whether the CAF would be properly funded. It seemed as if they would, as the new policy’s specific commitments included:
- Increasing defence spending from the paltry 1 percent of GDP to 1.4 per cent by 2024;
- Purchasing 88 advanced fighter jets to replace the aging CF-18 Hornets and building 15 Canadian surface combatant ships (i.e., large frigates) to replace the existing frigates and recently retired destroyers;
- Growing the regular forces by 3,500 to 71,500 troops and the reserves by 1,500 to 30,000, while reducing the typical time to process a new recruit from months to weeks; and
- Increasing women in the CAF by 1 percentage point per year to 25 percent by 2026.
While most of this sounded good – some of it very good – none of this lofty rhetoric was achieved. Some defence analysts consider it unlikely the Trudeau government ever intended to do so. Trudeau recently admitted part of this out loud when, according to leaked U.S. national security document, he stated at a NATO meeting last year that Canada would never meet the alliance’s 2-percent-of-GDP defence spending pledge. According to the Parliamentary Budget Officer, Canada in fiscal 2025 will spend $39 billion on national defence – just 1.29 percent of its GDP.
Nine years of Trudeau government have left the CAF a demoralized, depleted, decrepit and nearly shattered force. Where do Canada and its national defence dilemma go from here?
What the CAF Need to Be
The CAF is an essential part of Canada’s national security. The organization needs to be a vital, combat-capable military force for use in the geopolitical landscape of today and the future, able to face all threats foreign and domestic, to ensure Canada’s continued existence as an independent country. A military is defined, in simplest terms, by a minimum of five factors:
- Purpose.
- Combat-capable personnel.
- Military equipment.
- Combat capability deployment and support systems.
- Replacement systems – personnel, equipment and supplies.
Purpose
The first step in the CAF’s reconstruction must be to define their purpose. In my opinion, the purpose of the CAF must be apolitical, long-term and incorporate broad-based capabilities that serve Canada’s national interests as an independent, unified, democratic nation and are linked to Canada’s geopolitical situation. The purpose must also continue to reflect the longstanding national ethics and values the CAF was established to protect. The CAF’s purpose must not be shaped by political whims, media frenzies, short-term missions or even (primarily) alliance demands.
Sovereignty is a conceptual cornerstone of the military force of any “sovereign” nation. In basic terms it means the CAF must be capable of helping to maintain Canada’s unity, national borders, democratic system, citizens’ rights and freedoms, economic prosperity and citizens’ wellbeing.
Geopolitical realities need to be integrated into the CAF’s purpose. Canada is the world’s second-largest country by land area, much of it comprising inhospitable terrain. In population, however, Canada only ranks 38th in the world (not accounting for temporary residents and illegal migrants), with borders totalling many thousands of kilometres. So while completely safeguarding national sovereignty is the CAF’s primary goal, realistically speaking their purpose would need to include demonstrably cooperating with strong allies to maintain the integrity of Canada’s borders and, with this, its national sovereignty.
As we all know, Canada shares the continent with the world’s superpower – thankfully, a friend and ally. The U.S. has the reasonable expectation that its friend and ally – Canada – will not place its sovereignty at risk, either through Canada’s direct actions or by its failure to secure against foreign elements (be they countries, organizations or individuals) residing in or travelling through our country. Part of the CAF’s purpose must, therefore, be to actively and constantly demonstrate Canada’s intention and ability to help safeguard U.S. sovereignty.
Canada has the great geopolitical advantage of oceans on three of its four flanks, creating formidable (though not impenetrable) barriers against invasion or infiltration. Canada’s national interests, particularly its economic wellbeing, extend across these major oceans to other nations. The CAF’s purpose should include the role of demonstrating, where appropriate, our capabilities and intentions to aid and, in extreme cases, protect other countries in order to protect our own national interests.
Standing armed forces have always had one primary mission: to fight. Present-day citizens join the CAF with the full expectation that one day they may be called upon to fight for Canada. They understand the ‘unlimited liability’ nature of their service.
The CAF’s purpose must be evident to Canada’s citizens. The CAF must clearly, firmly and regularly communicate so that our citizens understand and support the fact that all six of our national interests rely on a resilient and fully resourced CAF. Money spent on the CAF is not an obstacle to advancing other national interests, it is the cornerstone of them. Until political leaders understand and enunciate the CAF’s purpose, too many citizens will likely believe the CAF is a burden to be endured rather than a vibrant part of our nation to celebrate.
Combat-Capable Personnel
Since the earliest nations, standing armed forces have had one primary mission: to fight. Present-day citizens join the CAF with the full expectation that one day they may be called upon to fight for Canada. They understand the “unlimited liability” nature of their service; it may cost them their lives. In return, they expect to be fully trained and equipped. The proud history of the CAF was based on these truths.
In addition to their core warfighting role, since the Second World War the CAF have been used by successive governments as a “peacekeeping force”, an “emergency management force” for wildfires and floods, a “training force for other nations” and, most recently, a social experiment laboratory of the latest transgender, DEI and cultural concepts, aka “wokism”. Every one of these actions has come at the expense of maintaining the CAF as combat-capable force.
Citizens may join the CAF for many reasons; some for belief in our country, some to bring discipline into their lives, some for adventure, and some because they just need a job. But these are secondary to the core mission. Above all, citizens join to be combat-trained, combat-exercised and combat-deployed to an environment where they will be tested to their limits and called upon to do daring things, providing along with the acute risks the reward of being proud of themselves and their fellow soldiers, sailors and airmen/women.
Every CAF member wears the maple leaf patch on their shoulders. They want to show the world that Canada is a serious country, a worthy and capable country – the country they proudly and gratefully call home. Most of them do not join to be in some sort of peace corps, to sit in a barracks for endless years, to act as unarmed civil servants, or to be ridiculed by the very public they are sworn to protect.
The training to become truly combat-capable requires years, not days, weeks or months. To progress from recruit to non-commissioned member (NCM) with the rank of sergeant can take ten years. This length of time is required to develop individual combat skills, small-unit combat skills, full-unit combat skills, and the leadership skills needed to lead others under the most difficult, dangerous and trying conditions. Knowledge must be gained and then turned into able decision-making in realistically dangerous situations. Skills acquired must be constantly practised and improved to ensure they are up-to-date and executable on a moment’s notice. The same is true for those seeking to be commissioned members (officers), though with a heavier emphasis on doctrinal knowledge and leadership.
The development of combat-capable members requires that they become not only physically fit but intellectually fit and ethically fit, and are instilled with the courage to apply all three traits in dangerous situations. Combat-capable members are also full Canadian citizens, expecting to be able to live relatively normal lives outside of their service. They may have spouses, children, homes, parents and all the other normal interests and obligations of civilians. But the unlimited liability of their military purpose comes first, which constantly affects their families, friends and loved ones. There’s an old recruiting motto from the late Cold War era that later became a joke to serving members: “There’s no life like it!”
The individual and collective training is continuous and involves extended periods away from home. Along with expected absences on operational deployments, over the span of their career a CAF member can average over four months away per year. (Even in their current, depleted state, the CAF has managed to sustain a small contingent of troops in Latvia, part of a NATO operation to demonstrate that its easternmost members will be defended against Russia.) The CAF is an all-volunteer force. The type of individual drawn to such a career and life must obviously like the CAF or they leave. Many love it and are clearly devoted; why else would they stay for 20, 30, sometimes 40+ years?
When they do retire, they return to civilian life and often new careers. While no longer combat-capable, they are veterans, deserving of the continued support of Canada for any wounds or injuries, visible or invisible, resulting from their military service.
In summary, combat-capable personnel are the single most important component of an effective CAF. Without properly trained personnel, the military is little more than a mob, its specialized and expensive equipment a waste of money. Creating and maintaining combat-capable personnel in sufficient numbers involves a difficult, continuous recruitment, training and replacement process. Crucially, this requires effective policy and long-term funding from a supportive government. In addition, without the recognition by Canada’s citizens of the CAF’s essential value, the organization could not function. Without citizens prepared to become CAF members, Canada could not achieve its national interests.
Military Equipment
A combat-capable military requires warfighting weapons and weapons systems to meet all aspects of its defined purpose. Obvious publicly visible examples are ships for the Royal Canadian Navy, fighter jets for the Royal Canadian Air Force and tanks, artillery and helicopters for the Army. Equally important are less-publicized items ranging from the mundane – rifles, pistols and even bayonets – to the sophisticated and leading-edge – drones, anti-tank missiles, radars and anti-ship and anti-aircraft systems.
Current CAF equipment is almost entirely outdated. Hangers and runways are filled with unserviceable aircraft, ports with broken ships and submarines, and army bases with broken vehicles parked against the fence and unserviceable weapons in depots, without spare parts or technicians to do the repairs. Notwithstanding a couple of ballyhooed procurement programs, no new equipment is arriving anytime soon.
Warfighting weapons and weapons systems must be demonstrably capable of responding to all the threats defined in the military’s purpose. They must be procured in sufficient quantity to meet the threats. They must be available constantly for training, demonstration (deterrence) and, ultimately, deployment and use.
Any required weapons system must be procured along with sufficient ammunition, replacement parts and repair capability, and in some cases with complete spares held in reserve for immediate replacement on the battlefield. This cannot be a “just in time” maintenance and supply system of the sort favoured in the commercial world. This must be a system that has “hardening”, speed of repair and significant redundancy in and of itself.
Napoleon Bonaparte stated, ‘The amateurs discuss tactics: the professionals discuss logistics.’ The combat-capable CAF must be deployable wherever and whenever they are required, in accordance with their defined purpose.
Military equipment includes everything from uniforms worn for all climates defined as possible development areas in the purpose statement, to personal protective equipment, tools and specialized devices used for warfighting, vehicles used in all types of terrain, fuels for this equipment, food and medical supplies for the deployed CAF, and infrastructure tailored for military use (such as hardened aircraft shelters, barracks, tents and field shelters). Again, all this equipment, supply and infrastructure must be combat-ready with resilient assurance systems.
Without such a range, quality and quantity of military equipment, the combat-capable citizens who serve in the CAF to defend our national interests are reduced to mere cannon-fodder.
Combat Capability Deployment and Support Systems
Napoleon Bonaparte stated, “The amateurs discuss tactics: the professionals discuss logistics.” The combat-capable CAF must be deployable wherever and whenever they are required, in accordance with their defined purpose. The capabilities must exist to sustain such deployments indefinitely. The deployment system must be thoroughly planned and routinely used or, during quieter periods, routinely exercised. This system must be self-sufficient and combat-resilient as regular support systems may be unavailable in wartime.
The mission of sovereignty entails a diversified nature for both the CAF’s combat capability and the deployment/sustainment element. Our massive coastline, undersea geography, airspace and diverse land mass require complex, diverse and widespread deployment and sustainment operations even within Canada. Entities that pose a threat to our national security must see both a permanent geographically based presence (in every province and territory) as well as a surge deployable capability that spans the country and reaches internationally.
Again, the civilian concept of “just-in-time” supply – with no spares, permanent inventory or room for error – is completely unviable for military deployment and sustainment systems. Like the weapons systems themselves, the deployment and sustainment systems must be hardened and flexible, with built-in redundancy, or the CAF’s deployed combat elements will soon devolve to cannon-fodder. Canada has a long history of supporting large expeditionary forces across oceans during wartime; restoring such a capability is not an unreasonable expectation, nor beyond the resources of a country of 40+ million with a $3 trillion annual GDP.
Replacement Systems – Personnel, Equipment and Supplies
The CAF must have both a routine and a surge capability for replacement of personnel, equipment and supplies.
Routine capability for personnel replacement centres on an active and purpose-led recruitment system. The process must be focused on identifying individuals with ingrained potential for combat capability. Recruitment must be driven by a need to find and select citizens who are best prepared to meet the combat-related needs of the CAF, who can be trained in the shortest realistic time-frame, and who will be most likely to make a career of their CAF service. Recruitment must also have a well-planned system for surge capacity, should replacement personnel be required in wartime.
Equipment wears out over time until it can no longer be repaired or becomes obsolete. The replacement system must be proactive in replacing worn-out systems and equipment, with direct links to procurement systems that are timely and pre-established. The CAF’s management of equipment must include a system for the pre-planned replacement before a particular item becomes obsolete. The replacement systems should be based on purpose-driven requirements rather than politics (this is, admittedly, much easier said than done).
The overall system must include a planning and replacement loop that is geared to the exigencies of war, in which all cycles speed up dramatically. Once deployed into combat or equivalent operations, equipment deteriorates faster and is more prone to breaking down or failing altogether. It is also more likely to become obsolescent as technological improvisation and innovation accelerate on both sides.
Replacement supply systems for consumables and equipment, as stated previously, must be resilient, including hardening, speed of repair and redundancy – and, as stated, must have an additional process to meet surge requirements.
Reaching Rock-Bottom
After nine years of broken promises concerning new equipment and funding, routine attacks on leadership failures, misuse as a gender and DEI testbed, disruption under the Covid-19 pandemic, embarrassment at the inability to provide modern combat-capable personnel and equipment to meet alliance demands and partnership roles, and occasional exploitation as props for political shows, the CAF has reached record lows for recruitment and retention. The organization is a broken, demoralized shell.
Canada is beset by national security challenges, arguably crises: shockingly deep and broad foreign interference in our institutions, worsening illegal protests in our streets, growing concern among our allies and trading partners, the open contempt of our adversaries, and the CAF’s own ‘death spiral’.
Trudeau’s current Defence Minister, Bill Blair, has called the recruitment collapse a “death spiral” and openly stated that the CAF is short over 16,500 members. Using the government’s own figures, with a posted strength of 71,000 and shortfall of 16,500, the CAF has just 54,500 members. The minister has also admitted, however, that of the remaining members, only 58 percent are deployable. That leaves a combat-capable force across all three main branches of just 31,600; the New York Police Department has 35,000 uniformed police officers. The solution Blair has proposed is grotesque: to suspend aptitude tests for some applicants and to start accepting recruits with medical conditions. This shows that the current government fails even to understand the purpose of the CAF, let alone how to rebuild Canada’s military.
Canada is beset by national security challenges, arguably crises: shockingly deep and broad foreign interference in our institutions, worsening illegal protests in our streets, growing concern among our allies and trading partners, the open contempt of our adversaries, and the CAF’s own “death spiral”. The requirement to rebuild our national security – centred on the CAF – is urgent and increasing. Since this cannot be handled by the Trudeau government, I am calling for the formation of a special task force with the mandate to create a roadmap for and initiate the rebuilding of the CAF.
Task Force on Rebuilding the CAF
The Task Force on Rebuilding the CAF should be non-partisan and composed of members with expertise in:
- Current and historical geopolitics;
- National security in areas such as intelligence, border security, immigration security, justice and law enforcement;
- Military operations and affairs including in the domains of land, sea, air, cyber and near-space;
- Rapid and cost-effective procurement ranging from simple logistical items to complex systems;
- Logistics including supply, transport, maintenance and infrastructure;
- Recruitment, human resources and personnel management;
- Financial management; and
- Other areas as may be required.
The Task Force would be charged to provide, within six months, a written report that included:
- A new comprehensive outline for the CAF’s purpose;
- The requirements for establishing a team to draft, within one year, a new White Paper on National Defence, with a comprehensive assessment of Canada’s intended geopolitical position vis-à-vis Canada, North America and the world;
- An immediate plan to retain to the greatest degree possible the CAF’s current combat-capable members;
- An immediate plan to recruit, train and retain new combat-capable personnel;
- The definition of a new, apolitical, fast-tracked (i.e., three years or less) procurement process to acquire the most urgently required combat equipment, equipment systems and supplies for all military branches;
- A plan to restore to serviceable condition the CAF’s existing military equipment and military equipment supply holdings;
- The definition of a new, apolitical and resilient process for procurement of all future CAF equipment and supplies;
- The definition of a new CAF combat-capability deployment and support system;
- A communications plan to assure public understanding and involvement in the CAF’s rebuilding; and
- Any proposed legislation that may be required to establish the systems needed to maintain a combat-capable and “evergreened” (i.e., renewed and reformed) CAF.
Following completion of its first six-month objectives, the Task Force would remain active for a minimum of three years in order to:
- Within one year research, draft and release a new White Paper on National Defence, having sought input from the government, national security agencies, economic organizations (public and private sectors) and citizens;
- Establish the geographical framework for CAF deployment throughout Canada, based on the new White Paper;
- Implement (or, in this and following instances, closely oversee the implementation of) the plan for the retention of combat-capable CAF personnel;
- Implement the plan for recruitment, training and retention of new combat-capable personnel;
- Oversee and execute the purchase of mission-essential combat equipment, equipment systems and supplies;
- Implement the plan to restore to serviceable condition the existing military equipment and military equipment supply holdings;
- Implement the new long-term procurement system for CAF equipment and supplies;
- Implement the new CAF combat-capable deployment and support system;
- Write and implement a plan for establishment of a surge replacement system for the CAF in times of increased tensions and/or war;
- Implement the public communications plan; and
- Work with the government on legislation, policy documents and regulations as required.
Throughout our nation’s proud history, Canadians have repeatedly risen to the national security challenges required to defend and maintain our freedoms and national sovereignty. When properly advised of the urgency and continuing nature of threats, they have proved prepared to allocate sufficient resources to national security and national defence. I believe they would do so again. The expertise to rebuild the CAF exists in Canada – inside and outside the CAF. It will take courage and determination to speak these truths and act upon them. Our country is at stake. The time to act, with vision and resources, is now.
Canada’s National Security at a Crossroads
The cliché has never been truer: Canada must decide if it wishes to be a nation or become a puppet of other nations.
The concept of a post-national state, espoused by our current prime minister, is a dangerous and deadly conceit as well as a plain lie in today’s actual geopolitics. Nations like China, Russia and Iran laugh at the notion and exert their sovereign, national influence and military power daily. Canada is shunned and ridiculed by its allies, partners and rivals. Here at home, our proud history of combat capability is fading into memory and may soon be forgotten – as are our veterans.
Despite the battering our country has endured, belief in Canada remains strong. Canadians have been clearly expressing a desire for change, including restoring the nation to its former unity, strong borders, vibrant economy and defence of our way of life.
If the CAF is the canary in the coal mine that signals the state of Canada’s national security, then the canary is on its back, fluttering. The political and military leadership that allowed, indeed designed and executed, the decades-long deterioration and borderline destruction of the CAF must ultimately be held accountable. The rebuild must start now, however – without them – using people who have a clear vision of the threats to our nation and national defence requirements to overcome them.
I continue to believe that Canada and Canadians are ready for a new way. It wasn’t so long ago – barely a decade ago in fact – that Canadians expressed optimism about their country and its role in the world. In 2013 Maclean’s magazine published an article entitled “99 reasons why it’s better to be Canadian”. A couple of years later, U.S. President Barack Obama told our Parliament, “The world needs more Canada” – and was referring to the CAF.
Despite the battering our country has endured, belief in Canada remains strong. Canadians have been clearly expressing a desire for change, including restoring the nation to its former unity, strong borders, vibrant economy and defence of our way of life. A proud and strong CAF was once a cornerstone of the nation’s enviable and happy state, and the rebuilding of the CAF can become a critical component of such a broader program of reform.
David Redman was an officer in the Canadian Army for 27 years, during which he was deployed on operations in Germany, Egypt, the Former Republic of Yugoslavia, the United States and across Canada, before retiring in 1999 to become the head of Crisis Management-Counterterrorism in Alberta and later the head of Emergency Management Alberta.
Source of main image: Shutterstock.
How much does Canada spend on its military?
The federal Parliamentary Budget Officer puts total military expenditures for fiscal 2024-25 at $39-billion, or 1.29% of GDP.
What are Canada’s NATO obligations for military spending?
As a NATO member, Canada is expected to allocate 2% of its GDP to defence spending; since that became official policy in 2006, Canada has never met the commitment. The Parliamentary Budget Officer puts this fiscal year’s spending at 1.29% of GDP ($39 billion).
What is the size of the Canadian Armed Forces?
The Government of Canada puts the CAF’s posted strength at 71,000, but Defence Minister Bill Blair has stated the military is short 16,500 members — which means it has just 54,500 across all ranks. Blair has admitted that only 58 percent of these are deployable, which leaves a combat-capable force across all three main branches of just 31,600. (The New York Police Department has 35,000 uniformed officers.)
